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ABSTRACT | One hundred days have passed since Bolsonaro took office, and there are two salient aspects of his 
presidency: first, it is clear that he was not tailored for the position he holds; second, the lack of preparation of 
his entourage and the absence of parliamentary support has led the country to a permanent state of crisis. In 
this article, I make an initial assessment of a presidency that was the direct outcome of a pivotal election that 
fractured the Brazilian political landscape and catapulted an unknown Congressman to the highest political office 
in the republic. The first part of the article covers the 2018 elections as the critical juncture of the Nova República 
[New Republic]. The second part delves into the main events Jair Bolsonaro’s first three months in office.
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Realineamiento político en Brasil: Jair Bolsonaro y el giro a la derecha
R E S U M E N  | Han pasado cien días desde la posesión de Bolsonaro, y existen dos aspectos centrales de su 
mandato hasta la fecha: primero, queda claro que no está hecho a la medida del cargo que ocupa; segundo, la 
falta de preparación de su séquito y la ausencia de base parlamentaria han llevado al país a un estado perma-
nente de crisis. En este artículo, hago una evaluación inicial de una presidencia que fue el resultado directo de 
unas elecciones decisivas que fracturaron el panorama político brasileño y catapultaron a un diputado descon-
ocido al principal cargo público de la república. La primera parte del artículo abarca las elecciones de 2018 y la 
coyuntura crítica de la Nova República. La segunda analiza los principales eventos de los primeros tres meses 
de la presidencia de Jair Bolsonaro.
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Realinhamento político no Brasil: Jair Bolsonaro e o giro à direita
R E SUMO | Cem dias se passaram desde que Bolsonaro assumiu o cargo, e há dois aspectos importantes de sua 
presidência: primeiro, está claro que ele não foi talhado para a posição que ocupa; segundo, a falta de preparação 
de sua equipe e a ausência de uma base parlamentar levaram o país a um estado de crise permanente. Neste artigo, 
faço uma avaliação inicial de uma presidência que foi o resultado direto de uma eleição crítica que fracionou o 
cenário político brasileiro e catapultou um congressista desconhecido para o mais alto cargo político da república. 
A primeira parte do artigo trata das eleições de 2018 como um ponto crítico da Nova República. A segunda parte 
investiga os principais eventos dos três primeiros meses de Jair Bolsonaro na presidência da República.
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On  1 January 2019 Jair Messias Bolsonaro took office as 
the 38th President of Brazil. Elected with 57.8 million 
votes,2 the former Army captain inherited a country 
with dismaying numbers. Upon his inauguration, 12.9 
million people were unemployed, and 27.5 million were 
considered ‘underutilised labour force’ —while 37.3 
million were in the informal market with no labour 
protection or social insurance (IBGE 2019). Brazil is 
the world leader in homicides with 63,380 per year. This 
means 30,8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Ipea & 
FBSP 2018) —the world average is around 8 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants. This is especially problematic 
when data show that 50.3% of deaths are young people 
between 15 and 19 years of age, and the rates for black 
people killed reached 40.2 per 100,000 —whereas for 
the non-black people the proportion was 16 per 100,000 
inhabitants (Ipea & FBSP 2018). Those are just some of 
the figures besetting the country the new Planalto Pal-
ace tenant was elected to govern.
Since Roosevelt coined the term ‘first 100 days’ in 1933, 
it has become commonplace for the press, the Congress 
and the business community to scrutinize the first 
actions of the new president in office. It is not a perfect 
measure, but for some analysts it is a useful one for gaug-
ing presidential effectiveness. Walsh (2009) observes 
that presidents “tend to be most effective when they 
first take office, when their leadership style seems fresh 
and new, when the aura of victory is still powerful, and 
when their impact on Congress is usually at its height”.
One hundred days have passed since Bolsonaro took 
office, and there are two salient aspects of his presi-
dency: first, it is clear that he was not tailored for the 
position he holds; second, the lack of preparation of his 
entourage and the absence of parliamentary support 
has led the country to a permanent state of crisis.
Within the first three months of his government, Bol-
sonaro has failed to show any real effectiveness, his 
leadership is virtually non-existent outside Twitter, the 
1 This saying literally means that tortoises (jabutis) cannot 
climb up trees by themselves. The expression is used figu-
ratively when one wants to say that on one occasion there 
is obviously something wrong, suspicious, which would 
certainly not happen without someone doing it on purpose. 
The approximate equivalent in English would be “there is 
something fishy about it”.
2 The new president received support from only 1/3 of the 
country. Fernando Haddad, the runner-up, received 47.04 
million votes —out of 104.83 million valid votes. 89.49 
million casted a protest vote, abstained, or voted against 
Bolsonaro as follows: abstentions (31.37 million; 21.3%), 
null votes (8.60 million; 7.43%), blank votes (2.48 million; 
2.14%) (TSE 2018).
aura of victory faded away quickly and already seems 
stale, and his impact on Congress has never been very 
significant, and is still liable to drop further.
If the readers are interested in a full account of the first 
100 days the Bolsonaro presidency, Gonzalez and Leme 
(2019) can provide much greater detail than I cover in 
this article. In this article, I make an initial assessment 
of a presidency that was the direct outcome of a critical 
election that fractured the Brazilian political landscape 
and catapulted an unknown Congressman to the high-
est political office in the republic. The first part of the 
article covers the 2018 elections as the critical juncture 
of the Nova República3 [New Republic]. The second part 
delves into the main events Jair Bolsonaro’s first three 
months in office.
I must warn the readers that due to the nature of the task 
and the ongoing political developments, the reflections 
recounted here are limited in scope, while they do follow 
the recent literature (Barros 2019; Nobre 2018; 2019; Pin-
heiro-Machado & Scalco 2018; Ramos & Gontijo in press; 
Singer 2012; 2018). The research uses primary sources 
found in the media and interviews4 conducted since Octo-
ber 2018, complemented by some theoretical reflections. 
It should be read more like a puzzle with missing pieces 
that will be parsimoniously added by history.
2018 Presidential Elections: Critical Juncture 
and Political Realignment
The political structure that has dominated the Nova 
República ended on 28 October 2018. Jair Bolsonaro, the 
far-right candidate, was elected as Brazil’s president, 
putting an end to the social-democratic pact estab-
lished after the generals left power. The reasons for his 
ascension, however, are not surprising.
Since the military coup that led to the establishment 
of the Republic in 1889, Brazilian politics has been 
indulgently paternalistic. Any conflict of ideas has 
been avoided at all costs when it comes to leading and 
managing social interests (Souza 2009). Brazilian mass 
democracy was created in the 1930s, having the state 
as the mediator of conflicts between social interests 
—with labour unions and patrons kept under the strong 
arm of the state. This arrangement made it much easier 
3 Nova República [New Republic] denotes the period in the 
history of Brazil starting in 1985, when the civilian govern-
ment was restored after a 21-year-long military regime.
4 Given the sensitive nature of the political content in these 
interviews, and the ongoing political process, the names of 
all sources were omitted, although all sources are referenced.
“Jabuti não sobe em árvore. Ou foi enchente ou foi mão de gente”1
Brazilian saying
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for those in power to ensure the re-election of allies, 
and also became the leading cause of state inefficien-
cy and corruption scandals in the country. Moreover, 
this practice was indulgently incorporated by both 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Brazilian Social Democ-
racy Party (PSDB; 1995-2002) and Lula da Silva’s Work-
ers Party (PT; 2003-2016) as their modus operandi.
Over the past three decades, political power in Brazil 
has been shared between the centre-right led by Car-
doso and Michel Temer5 and the centre-left led by Lula 
da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Although both sides never 
admitted it publicly, the same social-democratic ori-
entations drove many of their policies. Cardoso was 
responsible for the macroeconomic adjustment policy 
during the 1990s, and da Silva and Rousseff —riding on 
the international commodity boom— implemented and 
deepened social redistribution policies initially promot-
ed by Cardoso. This means that during the 2000s, a time 
when everyone —from entrepreneurs to traditional 
politicians— was benefitting from significant economic 
growth, any threat to the turbid links between business 
and politics was easily neutralised by the system.
The Brazilian state had never been structured to be nur-
tured by the society, but rather to exert tutelage over the 
citizenry (Faoro 2001). This top-down profile, with very 
low representation and accountability, led to multiple 
obscure links between private and state-run businesses 
(see Lazzarini 2010), creating an environment in which 
the act of taking from the State —in short, corruption— 
was a widely accepted and worthwhile practice.
The 2018 presidential election showed how fragile the 
political system was. Pundits and analysts have por-
trayed the presidential race as the most unpredictable 
since 1989. The lead-up to the first-round vote was 
indeed volatile, but the particular features of the Bra-
zilian political landscape offer us some clues to make 
sense of the country’s reality. In early August 2018, a 
few candidates appeared as potential winners of the 
presidential race. Among them were Lula da Silva 
(despite his 12-year prison sentence, which made him 
ineligible to stand for election); the former Army cap-
tain and federal deputy, Bolsonaro; the former PSDB 
governor of the state of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin; the 
former governor of the state of Ceará and Lula’s one-
time minister, Ciro Gomes; and Temer’s finance min-
ister (and former president of the Central Bank under 
Lula), Henrique Meirelles. The abundance of candidates 
5 Temer (Brazilian Democratic Movement, MDB) was elect-
ed twice as vice-president on Dilma Rousseff’s ticket (2010 
and 2014). By the end of 2015, when it became clear that the 
president had lost her political support in Congress, Temer 
overtly started to work to oust Rousseff from office. With 
more than two decades as a Congressman, the vice-presi-
dent represented a guarantee that the political machinery 
would continue to run; Dilma was by then considered perso-
na non grata by the majority of the Brazilian Congress.
reflected a political system that has thirty-five different 
political parties.
Campaigning ahead of the first-round vote was marked 
by a heated debate between the PT and the judiciary 
over Lula’s right to run for president —with the former 
president, in the end, declared ineligible and replaced 
on the PT ticket by Fernando Haddad. The most striking 
moment of the campaign, however, came when Bol-
sonaro, who led all voter intention polls, was assaulted 
with a knife while campaigning in Minas Gerais state 
on 6 September. These two events clearly illustrate the 
degree of national polarisation during the campaign.
On the surface, the polls told a relatively clear story of a 
simple contest between the left and the right. One side 
righteously defending morality, the other advancing 
progressive social policies; both portraying their vision 
as irreconcilable with the other. This simplistic drama 
was reflected in the first-round presidential vote. Bol-
sonaro garnered 46.03% of the vote with an inflamma-
tory alternative right-wing (alt-right) discourse against 
corruption under Lula and the PT. Haddad, the former 
mayor of the city of São Paulo, obtained 29.28%, which 
gathered together traditional left-wing voters and all 
those opposed to Bolsonaro. Gomes, the centre-left 
Democratic Labour Party (PDT)6 candidate, arrived in 
third place with 12.47% of the vote (TSE 2018).
A closer look at a different measurement of public opin-
ion in Brazil shows the complexity of mainstream pub-
lic opinion. Going beyond standard voting preference 
questions, the Instituto Paraná Pesquisas (2018, 5) asked 
people about which issues worry Brazilians the most 
for the country’s future. The biggest fears ahead of the 
election, in order, were: 1) violence, 2) economic growth, 
3) unemployment, 4) the health system, 5) corruption, 6) 
inflation/taxes and 7) education. Concerns two through 
seven can be labelled as ‘social threats,’ and are gener-
ally seen as better addressed by the left. However, vio-
lence, the deepest worry for the Brazilian public, falls 
into the category of ‘disgust-related’ threats, which in 
general are seen as being better handled by the right 
(for a review see Laham & Corless 2016).
Bolsonaro was the embodiment of those who viewed 
the 13 year-long PT government as a travesty of abject 
corruption and kleptocracy. Some have called him ‘the 
Trump of the Tropics’, or a Latin American version of 
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Although correct 
in characterising him as a populist politician with an 
authoritarian flavour, the analyses were biased by Don-
ald Trump’s electoral victory.
6 It is worth noting that Lula tried to isolate Gomes to keep the 
PT as the hegemonic voice on the left.
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Different from the US president, Bolsonaro does not 
have the same negotiation skills and insertion in 
national mainstream politics and business. He is a cap-
tain who was forced into retirement from the Army 
in 1988 after he threatened to bomb army barracks 
to obtain salary increases and then turned into an 
unsophisticated and mostly irrelevant federal depu-
ty. In twenty-seven years in Congress, he religiously 
collected the substantial benefits paid to Brazilian 
Congressmen in exchange for producing absolutely 
nothing besides controversial and aggressive rhetoric. 
Over almost three decades, Bolsonaro presented 150 
bills, with thirty-two favouring the military, only one 
in favour of educational matters, and other two about 
healthcare-related issues. Only one of these bills was 
eventually passed: PL 2.514/1996, for reducing taxes on 
industrial goods (see also Marini 2018).
Since 2013, Brazil’s economy has been shrinking, 12.9 
million people have become unemployed, and corrup-
tion scandals have achieved the banal status of daily 
news. Those problems, however, are very different from 
the sentiments of social disquiet and dislocation behind 
Trump’s ‘make America great again’ motto (see Mutz 
2018). Indeed, Trump’s logic and its appeal to those in the 
United States that feel excluded by globalisation cannot 
be applied to Brazil. Throughout the 2000s Brazil’s econ-
omy grew as it fed the world’s appetite for commodities. 
Millions were lifted out of poverty and elevated to the 
amorphous and ill-defined ‘new middle class’ (Neri 2011; 
Pochman 2012; Souza 2009 & 2010).
Brazil’s far-right overtly used the spread of misinforma-
tion and ‘fake news’ through social media to advance its 
discourse. For instance, the disgust mobilised and wea-
ponised by Bolsonaro is not limited to the figure of the 
‘criminal’; it is applied just as vigorously to the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, blacks, 
indigenous people, and feminists. These fake threats to 
society have nothing to do with crime or corruption but 
are powerful emotional drivers —as are the memes circu-
lating on Brazilian WhatsApp groups associating the PT 
involving child abuse, female nudity, and the like.
Social media was a major player in the 2018 elections. 
Up until then, TV political advertising was the primary 
means to reach out to Brazil’s electorate. Bolsonaro’s 
tight-budgeted campaign committee, however, relied 
heavily on political microtargeting via social media 
—and focused especially on professionalising a ‘fake 
news’ industry. In a country in which 70% of the pop-
ulation is functionally illiterate (Ação Educativa & Insti-
tuto Paulo Montenegro 2018), the effect of fake news 
disseminated via WhatsApp has been perverse.
While other candidates were unable to respond to the 
misinformation campaign launched through WhatsApp, 
Twitter, or Facebook, Bolsonaro’s campaign remained 
on the offensive, and he never came under pressure to 
defend his ideas while consolidating his lead in opinion 
polls. In the end, the assault on Bolsonaro in September 
unwittingly boosted his TV exposure, just as his social 
media campaign took off.
The alt-right message was multi-pronged, spreading 
social-status fears among those who felt (or could feel) 
their living standards dropping: the newly prosperous, 
the middle-class and those in the upper classes. Their 
appeal relies upon the anger and disquiet felt by those 
who benefited from the economic boom during the 2000s, 
but who have subsequently seen these gains evaporate. A 
recent survey conducted by Mutz (2018) found that those 
who changed their minds and voted for Trump were 
not guided by concerns for their economic status, but 
instead followed their underlying racist and misogynis-
tic thoughts. That is precisely the psychological mindset 
that Bolsonaro and his allies consistently tapped during 
the electoral campaign —and kept using as a mobilisation 
strategy during his first 100 days in office.
The connection is straight-forward: creating an envi-
ronment of fear and segregation leads to a competition 
between social and disgust-related threats. In this con-
text, the first-round majority for the conservative can-
didate was ensured, while other options in the ranking 
of fears seem to be blurred. Social psychologists have 
shown over the decades that tension and violence 
between social groups can enhance the tendency to 
make judgments based on group stereotypes, promot-
ing nationalistic attachment and support for nation-
alistic leaders. Bolsonaro’s whole campaign was built 
upon exploiting a political behaviour tied into a sense 
of fear —fear of being shot, of crime, of unemploy-
ment— that ends up creating space for the acceptance 
of authoritarian feelings latent in society. Research 
shows that, in a social environment in which struc-
tural and symbolic violence —among other threats— 
produce acute social constraints, left-wing political 
orientations are less likely to take root (Sibley, Osborne 
& Duckitt 2012). In the same context, research shows 
that individuals tend to rationally respond aggressive-
ly to threats, which would lead to conservative shifts 
(Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico & Napier 2009).
The alt-right vote in Brazil can be seen as a muted pro-
test by those who cannot understand the drastic chang-
es in the country over the past two decades, and do 
not have emotional and cognitive skills to accept that 
they do not know why their reality has changed. The 
cognitive dissonance levels between what such voters 
have in their minds and the real world have become 
extremely high, and an authoritarian discourse offers 
security and comfort, providing the illusion of immedi-
ate economic rewards, reducing their anxiety.
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The First 100 Days: The Art of Improvising  
or ‘the Worse, the Better’
On 2 November 2018 Bolsonaro delivered his first press 
conference as a newly elected president from his home 
in Rio de Janeiro. At that time, speaking to the national 
and international press in an informal and improvised 
manner, he showed what was to come next in his gov-
ernment: a succession of incompetent improvisations to 
deal with the res publica, and his utter lack of preparation.
The plan for the first 100 days seemed clear: have Con-
gress pass an urgent pension reform bill. The govern-
ment set out thirty-five goals for the period and bragged 
that “95% of them were accomplished” —although most 
of them were irrelevant, such as removing the wording 
‘Mercosur’ from Brazilian passport covers (Ernesto & 
Soares 2019).
This should also come as no surprise. In early April, Bol-
sonaro said that “he was not born to be president, but a 
military man” and reaffirmed that “he does not under-
stand economics” (Carvalho 2019) —the latter state-
ment occurred after a disastrous intervention in diesel 
prices that made Petrobras stocks plummet while the 
company lost BRL 32 billion in a single day.
Brazilians had elected a sincere president after all. In 
his campaign, he was crystal clear when he said that he 
did not understand anything about economics, agricul-
ture, or public health, among other topics. The country 
democratically chose someone who did not understand 
about politics, public administration, or statecraft. 
What has since happened, and will continue to happen, 
is precisely what was envisaged during the election 
campaign: Bolsonaro’s government has no concrete 
political or economic proposals, and no macro agenda 
for the country.
Fuelled by Resentment
When asked about matters related to public adminis-
tration during the campaign, besides reaffirming his 
lack of knowledge, Bolsonaro promised he would name 
technocrats to his cabinet. After all, although he did 
not understand anything about governing, he surround 
himself with qualified people who would help him to do 
so. The problem is that the supposed ‘best and bright-
est,’ that were to fill his cabinet turned out to be far 
from public service’s cream of the crop.
Bolsonaro’s ministerial appointments fell under three 
categories. The first are the ‘anti-globalists’, in line 
with polemicist Olavo de Carvalho —an eccentric 
YouTuber who became the ideological beacon for Bol-
sonaro and his sons— such as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ernesto Araújo. In the second group are the mil-
itary men who were early supporters of the president 
and who provided him with his ticket partner (and 
now vice-president) —the retired four-star general 
Hamilton Mourão. In the third group are the techno-
crats invited by Bolsonaro to legitimise his ignorance 
towards the markets (Scrivano & Ribeiro 2018), the 
Congress, and public opinion —this category includes 
the two almost-super Ministers Sergio Moro (Justice 
and Public Order), and Paulo Guedes (Economy).
Officials working in the Esplanada7 share a prevailing 
feeling of resentment with the political and economic 
establishment. During the campaign, deep-seated 
fears of a return to military rule resurfaced across the 
Brazilian left. Diniz argues that there is a politicisation 
of those in the Armed Forces who resent the social 
progress seen since 1985, including Jair Bolsonaro 
and many of his generation. They entered the mili-
tary academies during the military rule, expecting to 
participate in it and enjoy its benefits, but it came to 
an end before their chance to govern came around 
(Oliveto 2018). This means that some of those men had 
to live thirty years of resentment for not taking part in 
the privileges of military power. Diniz aptly observes 
that this is why “these soldiers were eager to seize 
power, democratic power” (Oliveto 2018) —in short, 
the opportunity to return to power under Bolsonaro 
seemed irresistible.
This is also the case with Paulo Guedes and Sergio Moro, 
who were at some point known as ‘super-ministers’, 
with enough power to make any reforms they deemed 
necessary for the country, and who were soon deautho-
rised by the president. Guedes holds a PhD in Economics 
from the University of Chicago but could never find an 
academic position in Brazilian university or a position 
in the government (see Gaspar 2018). He moved then to 
Chile and returned to Brazil where he made a series of 
investments and became a successful businessman. His 
resentment, however, never disappeared. In a detailed 
profile, Gaspar (2018) shows how Guedes gave up his 
‘pure’ Chicago Liberalism to accommodate his interest 
in power —manifested by an urge to drastically open the 
Brazilian economy to show his academic and business 
peers that his ideas had been correct all along, despite 
their long-standing disdain. Moro was the federal judge 
heading the Lava Jato Operation from 2014 to Novem-
ber 2018. This was the task force that revealed how 
structural corruption was the primary means of doing 
politics in Brazil (and somewhat, in other Latin Ameri-
can countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Venezuela). 
When invited by Bolsonaro in the aftermath of the 
elections, Moro stated that he had accepted the offer 
to “consolidate the anti-corruption gains” he had start-
ed as a judge —in a clear signal to those in the political 
world who tried to hinder his advancement or that of 
7 The area of Brasília where the ministerial buildings are 
located is called Esplanada dos Ministérios.
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his colleagues (“Mora aceita convite” 2018). Critical of 
the strategies used by politicians to escape the justice, 
Moro gave up his judicial career to become Bolsonaro’s 
minister (Neves 2018) —something he emphatically 
denied he would do over the past four years.
Last but not least, the case of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (FA) is peculiar. Ernesto Araújo’s appointment 
was a surprise to the Brazilian diplomatic corps. Recent-
ly promoted to a position that would allow him to even-
tually be appointed as Ambassador, he did not have the 
stature or the experience needed to lead the Ministry 
at Itamaraty; and it is precisely his lack of experience 
that led to his appointment. Araújo saw the opportunity 
to take on Itamaraty’s rigid hierarchical structure and 
play a new role in the Ministry —becoming a political 
shield to the new president domestically and abroad 
(Brazilian Diplomat B 2018). Burges and Chagas-Bastos 
(2017) have shown that foreign policy is unattractive 
for those seeking to share in the political pork. Araújo 
understood that by refraining from playing the political 
game he would not receive much attention or power, 
and transformed himself into Bolsonaro’s echo abroad. 
For example, when the president travelled to Israel, 
Araújo came up with the bizarre claim that Nazism was 
a left-wing ideology —following a similar statement 
Bolsonaro made during the 2018 campaign (see Dieg-
uez 2019). On the bureaucratic side, Araújo understood 
that he could climb up the ranks at lightspeed if he 
aligned himself with the zeitgeist —even if this meant 
sacrificing some coherence, given that he had been a 
long-standing PT supporter, and enthusiastic of Celso 
Amorim’s foreign policy (Brazilian Diplomat A 2019).
Fake Battles
These groups often sabotaged and collided against each 
other. The disharmony among them made Bolsonaro 
hesitate several times during his early days, and forced 
him to fire his Chief of Staff, and the first appointee 
to lead the Ministry of Education —among other sec-
ond-tier appointees who were also fired. Those battles, 
however, are not entirely genuine— as Nobre (2019) 
points out, “there is method in the chaos”.
In this regard, some commentators stress that Bolson-
aro and his sons have choreographed certain move-
ments. All the political confusion portrayed since the 
beginning by the president and his sons shows a pat-
tern of rehearsed sketches to demonstrate cohesion 
around the conservative values they defend (Freitas 
2019). Bolsonaro makes his best efforts to maintain 
the public debate around beliefs, given that this is his 
only strategy —an imaginary crusade where Bolsonar-
ism uses inappropriate comments as his weapons. For 
instance, in late January 2019 Bolsonaro accused his 
former Chief of Staff, Gustavo Bebbiano, of lying about 
talking to him about the political crisis enveloping his 
party —the Social Liberal Party (PSL)— during his con-
valescence at the hospital. As leaked audios proved 
weeks later, both men indeed exchanged WhatsApp 
audio messages (“Entenda a crise” 2019). Moreover, 
during Carnival in February, Bolsonaro shockingly 
tweeted an explicit short video showing of one man 
urinating on another during a street carnival parade, 
and then asked what such sexual practice was (“Brazil-
ian President Jair” 2019).
Those false political battles fulfil multiple functions. 
First, they mobilise an electorate that sees few concrete 
advances, and no political agenda to tackle the rampant 
unemployment and the stagnant economy. Second, they 
keep Bolsonaro’s anti-system and transgressive char-
acter alive, much as he ran his campaign on a political 
liturgy filled with unbelievable nonsense. Finally, they 
disguise the government’s administrative incapacity and 
help to cover up its setbacks (Boghossian 2019).
The crises caused by the president and his sons (in par-
ticular, Carlos Bolsonaro), however, hijack the public 
debate. Brum (2019) in a brilliant analysis argues that 
Bolsonaro is an anti-president, which means he emu-
lates (and neutralises) his opposition. Moreover, when 
Bolsonaro and his sons issue controversial statements 
(mostly on social media), they occupy the national 
debate instantly —as the question on Twitter about 
“what’s a golden shower” in mid-February—, blocking 
any possibility of serious debate around the country’s 
needs. In doing so, the Bolsonarism occupies all roles: 
it simulates opposition and criticism —destroying the 
nature of politics and the democratic essence. Brum 
notes that “by dictating the rhythm and content of the 
days, he turned an entire country into a hostage” (Brum 
2019). All of this would not be possible without the mas-
sive presence of the president and his aides on social 
media —as if they were still on the campaign.
Brazil does not escape from the zeitgeist: ‘society’ has 
been confused with ‘social media’. Such overexposure 
has come at a high cost: after three months, the gov-
ernment is already ‘old’.
The Habit of Wasting Political Capital to Gain 
People’s Support
From what academics and pundits predicted during 
the campaign leading up to the runoff polls, Brazil is 
destined to some dark years ahead. Putting the back-
ward rhetoric aside, the president elect will face more 
critical constraints than trying to make his verbiage 
real. For 2019, there is little budgetary leeway: less 
than R$ 120 billion (or US 32 billion) are available to 
manage the country, invest in public services, and 
most importantly, negotiate with the Congress to see 
his campaign promises take off (Ministério da Econo-
mia 2019). The bitter measures needed to restructure 
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the economy would be severe enough already in a 
scenario of institutional normality, and become even 
harsher in an environment of ideological polarisation. 
Bolsonaro’s government started with and still is under 
a non-negligible risk of short-term collapse.
As described by Brazilian economists, over the past thir-
ty years (1988-2018) Brazil’s economy “flew like a chick-
en”, i.e. expanded and contracted in short bursts that, 
on average, made the economy grow by 2,2% per year 
—in comparison, from 1958-1987 the Brazilian econo-
my grew 6,6% per year on average (World Bank 2019). 
Bolsonaro and Guedes bet on pension reform to succeed 
during their first year, which would provide some bud-
getary leeway, attract foreign investment, and in con-
sequence, make the economy grow. As of the writing of 
this article, pension reform (or any other reform) hasn’t 
yet passed the first stages within the legislative process 
—and Congress hasn’t shown any goodwill toward the 
president and his Minister of Economics.
Members of Congress have defined Bolsonaro and his 
sons’ attitudes in social media as “mediocre”, “infantile”, 
and “basic” (Brazilian Federal Deputy B 2019; Brazilian 
public official, A 2019). Political actors in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate fear that the rapid deteriora-
tion of the president’s image might lead to a significant 
loss of respect —by the Congress and public opinion— 
and make even more difficult the already complicated 
negotiations around the structural reforms Brazil 
urgently needs (Brazilian Federal Deputy A 2019).
This only adds to the absence of a parliamentary basis 
in Congress. Bolsonaro’s PSL, elected 55 deputies and 4 
senators in 2018, which is insufficient to pass any bill. 
Nonetheless, the president refuses to negotiate the 
formation of a government coalition, calling it “politics 
as usual” —or “old politics” in Bolsonaro’s terms. As I 
noted above, Bolsonaro rejects politics, associating it 
with corruption, clientelism and gerrymandering —
which is precisely what he has been doing since taking 
office, but calling it ‘new politics’ or ‘non-ideological 
politics.’ This is only possible thanks to the fragile 
state Brazilian institutions have reached since the 
never-ending political crisis set in motion by Rous-
seff’s impeachment process in 2015.
One of the main reasons for Bolsonaro’s accession to 
power is Brazil’s current institutional fragility. This 
was not a result of supposed authoritarians, but of 
self-proclaimed democrats. Brazil lives now in the 
aftermath of four years of political turmoil: a combi-
nation of a muscled Judiciary strong-arming a flawed 
Legislature, and a fragile Executive. This has led to a 
reproduction of the pattern by which laws are obeyed 
and enforced selectively, —i.e. everyone is in some sense 
an outlaw, and it is essential that everyone exercises 
power outside the law because the rules only apply to 
one’s ‘enemies’.
The president does not seem to understand politics, 
i.e. the art of peaceful conflict resolution and interest 
accommodation that guarantees the rational and sol-
idary division of the limited resources available. He 
despises debate, dissent, and those who think differ-
ently from him —which makes sense given his irrele-
vant record after three decades in Congress, where he 
specialised in promoting division and spreading resent-
ment. The ideal scenario for him is one in which the 
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary are in a con-
stant tug-of-war, in a sequence of crises that weaken 
institutions, while himself and his aides remain intact 
as the defenders of ethics and ‘moral values’.
Final Remarks
The South American giant wound up electing a captain 
who was expelled from the army, a deputy who did 
nothing useful while in Congress, and an opportunist 
with a talent for repeating common-sense prejudices. 
Bolsonaro ended his first 100 days as the least popular 
president since democracy came back to Brazil in 1988. 
In early January, 64% of Brazilians said they trusted 
the new president would perform well or very well. 
One hundred days later, only 35% continue to believe 
in the former army captain. The number of those who 
distrust him grew from 30% to 44% (CNI 2019).
All in all, Bolsonaro’s tenure might be as dark as the sib-
yls foretold, or, in the best-case scenario, just an unfor-
tunate episode of a sad comedy. After these first three 
months, it leans more to the dark side than the comic. 
To be noted is that the left has a special degree of guilt 
in Bolsonaro’s quick rise. Its response to the alt-right 
is reminiscent of the reaction by the Latin American 
left to Trump. All doom and gloom, but not engaging 
with the root causes that led to Bolsonaro’s victory and 
instead of doubling down on apocalyptic rhetoric.
Bolsonaro’s push to the right has deep roots in Brazilian 
history, and it has not happened overnight. Democra-
cy and citizenship were achieved for the wealthy and 
white; while the black and the poor have never been 
integrated to receive its benefits. Brazil —like many 
of its South American neighbours— remains a veiled 
authoritarian and racist country.
Within a short time, Bolsonaro proved to be unfit for the 
position he occupies. There is a feeble understanding of a 
long-standing and central issue in Brazilian politics: ram-
pant inequalities. It will not take long until it comes back 
to the centre of the public debate —whether Bolsonaro 
likes it or not. The tight budget for social investment and 
the depletion of the ‘new middle class’ and the upward 
social mobility (based on rising income, formal jobs, 
more schools, better employment opportunities etc.) 
experienced during the 2000s, will bring political conse-
quences to this right-leaning electoral realignment. He 
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ignores the role of income, and the proper understand-
ing of the composition of the Brazilian economic pyra-
mid —and the position of the poor and the middle class 
within it (see Chagas-Bastos 2015).
The president and his cabinet’s erratic movements indi-
cate improvisation and lack of planning. The only solid 
plan Bolsonaro shows is a crusade against the left, com-
munism and the destruction of the Christian values —a 
bad adaptation of the Cervantine quest. People want 
to know from their president how he will reduce the 
64 thousand annual violent deaths, create formal jobs 
for the 13 million unemployed, guarantee the payment 
of pensions and minimum wage, and build sewage to 
half of the schools that do not yet have any —to mention 
some of the most pressing problems.
References
1. Ação Educativa & Instituto Paulo Montenegro. 2018. 




2. Barros, Celso Rocha de. 2019. “A queda. Hipóteses 
sobre o governo Bolsonaro.” Piauí 150. https://piaui.
folha.uol.com.br/materia/a-queda-2/
3. Boghossian, Bruno. 2019. “Novo vexame é marca de 
governo que tem pouco a mostrar e muito a esconder.” 




4. “Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro shocks with ‘golden 
shower’ tweet”. 2019. NBC News, 8 March. https://www.
nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/president-bolsonaro-
shocks-brazil-golden-shower-tweet-n980476
5. Brum, Eliane. 2019. “Cem dias sob o domínio dos 
perversos.” El País, 13 April. https://brasil.elpais.com/
brasil/2019/04/10/opinion/1554907780_837463.html
6. Burges, Sean W. & Fabrício H. Chagas-Bastos. 2017. 
“The Importance of Presidential Leadership for 
Brazilian Foreign Policy.” Policy Studies 38 (3): 277-290.
7. Carvalho, Daniel. 2019. “Não nasci para ser presidente, 




8. Chagas-Bastos, Fabrício H. 2015. “Electoral Realign-
ment and Economic Change Among Brazil’s ‘New 
Middle Classes’.” Latin American Politics and Society 
57 (3): 147-154.
9. Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI). 2019. 
“Pesquisa CNI-Ibope: Avaliação do Governo (abril 
2019).” Brasília. https://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/
estatisticas/pesquisa-cni-ibope-avaliacao-do-governo/
10. Dieguez, Consuelo. 2019. “O chanceler do regresso.” 
Piauí 151. https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-
chanceler-do-regresso/
11. “Entenda a crise que atinge o PSL, partido de Jair 
Bolsonaro.” 2019. G1, 14 February. https://g1.globo.
com/politica/noticia/2019/02/14/entenda-a-crise-
que-atinge-o-psl-partido-de-jair-bolsonaro.ghtml
12. Ernesto, Marcelo & Ingrid Soares. 2019. “Bolsonaro diz que 
metas para os 100 dias de governo foram 95% cumpri-




13. Faoro, Raymundo. 2001. Os donos do poder: Formação 
do patronato político brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Globo.
14. Freitas, Janio de. 2019. “O circo.” Folha de S. Paulo, 
28 April. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/
janiodefreitas/2019/04/o-circo.shtml
15. Gaspar, Malu. 2018. “O fiador.” Piauí 144. https://piaui.
folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-fiador/
16. Gonzalez, Elizabeth & Luisa Leme. 2019. “Tracking the 
First 100 Days of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.” 
Americas Society/Council of the Americas, 11 April. 
https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-first-100-
days-brazilian-president-jair-bolsonaro
17. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE). 2019. “Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios (PNAD) Contínua; Principais resul-




18. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) & 
Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP). 2018. 
Atlas da Violência 2018. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea.
19. Instituto Paraná Pesquisas. 2018. “Pesquisa de Opin-
ião Pública Nacional.” https://static.poder360.com.
br/2018/05/Situac%CC%A7a%CC%83o-Atual-do-Bra-
sil-Mi%CC%81dia.pdf
20. Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski & Frank J. 
Sulloway. 2003. “Political Conservatism as Motivated 
Social Cognition.” Psychological Bulletin 129 (3): 339-375.
21. Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico & Jaime L. Napi-
er. 2009. “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, 
and Elective Affinities”. Annual Review of Psychology 
60: 307-337.
22. Laham, Simon M. & Chelsea Corless. 2016. “Threat, 
Morality and Politics: A Differentiated Threat Account 
of Moral and Political Values.” In The Social Psychology of 
Morality, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, Lee Jussim, Paul A. 
M. Van Lange, 56-70. New York: Routledge.
23. Lazzarini, Sergio. 2010. Capitalismo de Laços. Rio de 
Janeiro: Elsevier.
24. Marini, Luisa. 2018. “Em 27 anos de Câmara, Bolsonaro 
prioriza militares e ignora saúde e educação.” Congresso 
em Foco, 7 August. https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.
br/eleicoes/na-camara-bolsonaro-prioriza-militares-
e-ignora-saude-e-educacao/
100 D E B A T E
rev.estud.soc. No. 69 • julio-septiembre • Pp. 92-100 • ISSN 0123-885X • e-ISSN 1900-5180 · https://doi.org/10.7440/res69.2019.08
25. Ministério da Economia. 2019. “Governo Central cumpre 
meta fiscal e encerra 2018 com déficit de R$ 120,3 




26. “Moro aceita convite de Bolsonaro para comandar o 




27. Mutz, Diana C. 2018. “Status Threat, Not Economic 
Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote.” PNAS 
115 (19): E4330-E4339.
28. Neri, Marcelo. 2011. A nova classe média: O lado 
brilhante da base da pirâmide. Rio de Janeiro: Saraiva.
29. Neves, Lucas. 2018. “Cansei de levar bola nas costas, diz 
Moro sobre troca de Judiciário por Executivo.” Folha de 
S. Paulo, 3 December. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/
poder/2018/12/cansei-de-levar-bola-nas-costas-diz-
moro-sobre-troca-de-judiciario-por-executivo.shtml
30. Nobre, Marcos. 2018. “A revolta conservadora.” Piauí 
147. https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/a-revolta-
conservadora/
31. Nobre, Marcos. 2019. “O caos como método.” Piauí 
151. https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-caos-
como-metodo/
32. Oliveto, Paloma. 2018. “‘Há uma politização de ressen-
tidos’, diz antropóloga brasileira exilada.” Estado de 





33. Pinheiro-Machado, Rosana & Lucia Scalco. 2018. “Da 
esperança ao ódio: Juventude, Política e Pobreza do 
Lulismo ao Bolsonarismo.” Cadernos IHU Ideias 16 
(278): 3-15.
34. Pochmann, Marcio. 2012. Nova classe média? O 
trabalho na base da pirâmide social brasileira. São 
Paulo: Boitempo.
35. Ramos, Leonardo & Caio Gontijo. (In press). “Caesa-
rism, populismo and the 2018 election in Brazil.” Cap-
ital & Class.
36. Scrivano, Roberta & Ana Paula Ribeiro. “A investidores 
financeiros, Bolsonaro diz: ‘não entendo nada de 
economia’.” O Globo, 7 February. https://oglobo.globo.
com/brasil/a-investidores-financeiros-bolsonaro-diz-
nao-entendo-nada-de-economia-22375242
37. Sibley, Chris G., Danny Osborne & John Duckitt. 2012. 
“Personality and Political Orientation: Meta-analysis 
and Test of a Threat-Constraint Model.” Journal of 
Research in Personality 46 (6): 664-677.
38. Singer, André. 2012. Os sentidos do lulismo. Reforma 
gradual e pacto conservador. São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras.
39. Singer, André. 2018. O lulismo em crise: o quebra-cabeça 
do período Dilma (2011-2016). São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras.
40. Souza, Jessé. 2009. A ralé brasileira. Quem é e como 
vive? Belo Horizonte: UFMG.
41. Souza, Jessé. 2010. Os Batalhadores Brasileiros. Nova 
Classe Média ou Nova Classe Trabalhadora? Belo 
Horizonte: UFMG.
42. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). 2018. “Divulgação 
de Resultados de Eleições.” http://divulga.tse.jus.br/
oficial/index.html
43. Walsh, Kenneth. 2009. “The First 100 Days: Franklin 








45. Brazilian Diplomat A. (2019). 5 January, Brazil.
46. Brazilian Diplomat B. (2018). 20 November, Brazil.
47. Brazilian Federal Deputy A. (2019). 22 March, Brasília, 
Brazil.
48. Brazilian Federal Deputy B. (2019). 15 March, Brasília, 
Brazil.
49. Brazilian Public Official A. (2019). 17 March, Brasília, 
Brazil.
